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Contractual injunctions have emerged as key instruments of social control. They 
provide agencies such as the police with unique powers to manage deviant persons by 
forcing the recipients, via the threat of criminal sanction on breach of the injunction, 
to engage in self-control of their behaviour. This article develops understandings of 
how contractual injunctions are actually used in practice by the police. Analyses of 
the different ways contractual injunctions are directed at certain social groups are 
developed in relation to police occupational cultures that place limits and 
possibilities on their application. It concludes by locating the broader social effects of 
contractual injunctions with issues of urban marginality and growing powers to 
criminalize social predicaments.  
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Introduction  
 
The use of contracts as methods of dealing with criminal and anti-social behaviour 
has disturbed many traditional conceptions of punishment. Rather than dealing with 
acts that infringe the criminal law through due process, trial and related juridical 
dictates, contracts resort to the civil law as a method of inducing compliance in 
deviant persons. These regulatory forms have focused on inducing compliance 
without necessarily applying the law as a formal social control mandate, commonly 
using the law as a surround vehicle to instil self-control in the recipient. In the United 
Kingdom, the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO), Anti-Social Behaviour Contract 
(ABC) and a host of similar regulatory mechanisms have provided both criminal and 
non-criminal justice agencies with a gamut of powers to tackle low-level incivilities. 
Recent work has begun to address the growth in contracts as methods of dealing with 
deviant behaviour in nations including the United Kingdom (Crawford 2003; Burney 
2005; Squires and Stephen 2005; von Hirsh and Simester 2006) and the United States 
(Flanagan 2003; Beckett and Herbert 2008).  
Since the 1980s, the governance of social life through the model of contract has 
expanded rapidly both as a rhetorical gesture and as a substantive tool for regulating 
deviant behaviour across many areas of social policy (Vincent-Jones 2000; Sol and 
Westerveld 2005; Zumbansen 2007). Within criminology, the nature of contractual 
injunctions has been closely tied with debates about responsibilization (O’Malley 
1992; Garland 1996; Crawford 2003; Mackenzie 2008) that claim that the bygone 
idea of the state dictating the conditions of social control has given way to an 
increasing emphasis upon ideas of self-regulation and self-help. According to Rose 
(1999), responsibilization utilizes the language of freedom within the political frame 
of neo-liberalism as a mechanism through which to persuade and align individuals, as 
opposed to directing them in quasi-paternalistic ways. Emphasis on ideas of self-
regulation implies that individuals are controllers of their own lifestyles and fates, 
able to make reasoned choices and take steps to change their behaviour. Contractual 
  
1ASBOs are civil orders granted by the courts to pose contractual restrictions upon the adjudged ‘anti-
social’ elements of an individual’s behaviour. The courts frequently draw a list of the behaviours in 
need of restriction based on the evidence and may impose a time period for the duration of the ASBO, 
depending upon the perceived risks to public safety. A breach of an ASBO can warrant a custodial 
sentence. ABCs are voluntary contracts signed between individual and agency/s, which, like the ASBO, 
draw up a list of prohibitions and incentives to comply with the contract. Whilst the contracts are 
voluntary, refusal to sign can often be treated as the individual being purposefully resistant to help, 
which can sometimes lead to alternative forms of social control being used. 
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I acknowledge the role played by housing officers in the social control of tenants, but focus 
specifically on the role of the police during this article. 
3
By young adults, this commonly consisted of male populations aged between 18 and 30 (see also 
Appendix). 
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injunctions, such as Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) and Acceptable 
Behaviour Contracts (ABCs)
1
 have been framed as prohibitive tools that also serve to 
‘empower’ the recipient by enabling them to avoid criminal sanctions by complying 
with the terms of the injunction. In practice, true devotion to the notion of 
empowerment is often rather mild amongst social control agencies such as the police 
and prison service, as well possessing a more sinister side in expanding forms of 
social control concealed in repressive forms of punishment (Hannah-Moffatt 2000; 
O’Malley 2001; Moore 2007).  
This article develops understandings of the use of contractual injunctions in two ways. 
First, it analyses how contractual injunctions are used by the police
2
 towards 
particular social groups including analysis of the ways police occupational cultures 
serve to apply injunctions in selective ways that expand and limit the criminalization 
of particular social groups. The article thus draws on existing work associated with 
police occupational cultures (e.g. Fielding 1994; Herbert 1998; Waddington 1999; 
Reiner 2000), applying it to inform understanding of how everyday forms of 
discretion and decision making speciﬁc to the use of contractual injunctions take place. 
On the one hand, police occupational culture is commonly described as based on the 
direct and indirect use of authority as a mechanism for inducing conformity in deviant 
persons—features that seem to ﬁt comfortably with the idea of contractual injunctions 
by subjecting deviant behaviour to a codiﬁed set of prohibitions endowed with legal 
bite. On the other hand, these same enactments of authority that justify messages of 
‘cop knows best’ seemingly dent the idea that the recipient can be empowered to 
practise self-control over their behaviour. The article charts the validations of, and 
tensions with, the use of contractual injunctions by police ofﬁcers through the 
diversity of occupational frames and working cultures.  
The second theme of the article argues for two main uses of contractual injunctions in 
terms of application towards certain social groups. The ﬁrst is to induce conformity in 
persons who, it is felt, can be deterred by contractual injunctions, namely ﬁrst-time 
offenders and young people involved in minor incivilities and petty crime. The second 
is to instil a series of conditions intended to induce self-control in the absence of long-
term outreach services, particularly amongst young adult offenders
3
 with a range of 
social and psychological problems. This builds on existing research that has analysed 
the main groups receiving contractual injunctions, namely disadvantaged young 
people and ‘vulnerable’ adults (Campbell 2002; Fitzpatrick and Jones 2005; Hunter 
and Nixon 2008). The article contributes to these literatures by examining the 
processes involving the use of contractual injunctions, including how discretion is 
actively used towards recipients considered ‘worthy’ (e.g. certain young people, those 
from troubled backgrounds) and denied where recipients are either deemed 
‘unworthy’ or ‘irredeemable’ (adult offenders, drug addicts, alcoholics, homeless 
persons, etc.). This engages with the ways through which the police manipulate 
decisions to use contractual injunctions against certain persons through selective 
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application of the self-regulatory logics, adjoining these with appropriation of victim 
and community protection discourses that are used to add legitimacy and limit 
resistance from welfare-orientated agencies.   
The article will begin by addressing the reasons behind the growth of contractual 
injunctions as mechanisms for inducing social control, considering their expansion in 
accordance with traditional judicial forms of punishment, as well their effects in 
codifying behaviours separate but analogous to crime and anti-social behaviour. Then 
follows an analysis of ﬁeldwork data drawing on 204 qualitative case studies gathered 
from ethnographic ﬁeldwork looking at the decision-making processes amongst police 
and other social control agencies using contractual injunctions, including interviews 
with actors from these forums. The article concludes by situating the use of 
contractual injunctions within debates about the resource-stretched and dwindling 
existence of community service provision, arguing that the proliferation of contractual 
injunctions can be used to both enforce mandatory service response and serve as futile 
tools to instil compliance in ‘hard to change’ persons.  
 
Contractual Injunctions and Self-Governance  
 
Several authors charting the growth of contractual modes of social control (Matthews 
1988; Nelken 1988; Crawford 2003) have recognized how the ethos of self-
governance has emerged as a social practice used to activate subjects to become self-
governing actors’—to recognize the root of their wrongful behaviour and enact self-
control in line with varying prohibitions and incentives. Despite claims that 
contractual injunctions are largely about prohibiting the activities and routines of the 
recipient—which can often contribute to increasing their chances of being 
criminalized—the legitimacy for their usage has been inspired by neo-liberal values 
of self-governance that place the recipient as controller of their behaviour and 
activities. To paraphrase Crawford (2003), contracts are a metaphor for ‘regulated self 
regulation’ (p. 488), activating social control as a mode of self-governance in the 
shadow of potential legal sanctions. Contractual injunctions recognize the active 
‘choice’ of the recipient as a rational being able to change their behaviour, persuading 
and aligning them to comply with agencies of social control. As Crawford posits:  
 
Given the language of choice, autonomy, and voluntariness, in which contracting is 
couched, the failure of a given party to adhere to their self-imposed and agreed part of 
the bargain, means that they have failed themselves—by breaking their own 
promise—as well as their obligations to others. (Crawford 2003: 503)  
 
Based upon liberal rationalities of rational-choice and utilitarian calculation, 
contractual injunctions are premised on modiﬁcation of behaviour through forms of 
individual deterrence as quasi forms of prevention. Rather than jumping directly to 
the use of juridical sanctions, contractual injunctions are seen as ‘preventive’ by 
aiding the recipient to comply and thus avoid judicial consequences through breach. 
The recipient is adjudged to have a choice to change, supported by the opportunity to 
understand the consequences of their behaviour and practise self-control. Contractual 
injunctions have subsequently been considered less punitive forms of response 
towards anti-social behaviour and low-level offending, granting the recipients the 
opportunities and abilities to take control of their lifestyle and behaviour in ways 
which appear conducive to normal forms of civility. As the following governmental 
deﬁnitions of contractual injunctions illustrate:  
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The main aim is to lead perpetrators towards recognition both of the impact of their 
behaviour, and of the need to take responsibility for their actions. For this reason it is 
important that the individual should be involved in drawing up the contract. (Home 
Ofﬁce 2007: 2)  
 
Whilst an ASBO is indeed likely to prohibit speciﬁc anti-social actions, it can prohibit 
any action judged as necessary to prevent further ASB. It can thus include, for 
instance, prohibitions against entering particular areas, congregating with particular 
people, or even wearing particular items of clothing. (House of Commons Select 
Committee 2005: 63)  
 
Although the liberal rationalities of contractual injunctions have certainly been 
dominant in terms of the overall framing of their social control operatives, it is argued 
that conventional forms of tutelage are also employed in correcting people or, in the 
words of Elizabeth Burney, ‘making people change’ (Burney 2005). This has 
emanated from the wider politics of anti-social behaviour (e.g. Home Ofﬁce 2003; 
Respect Task Force 2006) associated with conventional forms of class control and 
moderation of ‘bad culture’ resonating from historical framings of the 
respectable/non-respectable working classes (Garrett 2006; Gillies 2008).  
The uses of contractual injunctions as methods of social control have grown 
considerably during the past decade. Home Ofﬁce data on the uses of ASBOs show a 
signiﬁcant rise from 104 orders in 1999 to a peak of 4,122 in 2005 (Home Ofﬁce 
2007). Data on the uses of ABCs show a similar increase from 4,946 in 2003/04 to 
7,500 in 2005/06 (Respect Task Force 2007). Parenting contracts stipulating 
conditions for parents of anti-social children to follow have also increased from 652 
orders in 2003/04 to 2,268 in 2005/06. These increases can be explained largely by 
the state’s successive publicity campaigns from 2003 onwards, which have inﬂuenced 
local authorities, including police and housing associations, to make greater use of 
contractual injunctions as important regulatory tools against low-level crime and 
disorder (see Burney 2005; Crawford 2009). Research on the use of ASBOs in 
England and Wales has shown that 55 per cent of orders are breached (NAO 2006), 
with approximately 46 per cent of all breaches resulting in a custodial sentence 
(Campbell 2002). This has raised serious questions regarding their capacities for ‘net 
widening and mesh thinning’ (Cohen 1985), supplementing (and not replacing) 
existing forms of punishment such as imprisonment, ﬁnes and community penalties, 
as well as further compounding social divisions and inequality by concentrating on 
familiar folk devils such as disadvantaged young people, the mentally ill and 
substance addicts. It is no coincidence that the proliferation of contractual injunctions 
has developed in tandem with changes in the composition of urban poverty, 
criminalization of marginal populations and gentriﬁcation of urban spaces. As a 
number of studies have illustrated, removal of ‘undesirable’ persons from spaces of 
consumption has been a common tactic used by the police and a range of private 
security agencies through curfew-based and related spatial ordinances (Shearing and 
Stenning 1985; Coleman and Sim 2000; Harcourt 2001; Bannister et al. 2006; Herbert 
2008; Beckett and Herbert 2010).   
The difﬁculty for the police in dealing with socially marginal groups such as the 
homeless and those with substance misuse and mental health problems is that often 
their behaviour consists merely of minor public order infractions and therefore 
beneath the level of criminal sanction and possible custodial penalty. Contractual 
injunctions are commonly used to counteract this difﬁculty by removing socially 
  
5 
marginal populations from the streets, particularly through tools such as ASBOs, 
which link together the framework of a civil contract with criminal ramiﬁcations on 
breach. As research on the use of ASBOs has highlighted, orders have been used 
disproportionately against homeless persons, socially disadvantaged young people 
and those with mental health and substance misuse problems (Fitzpatrick and Jones 
2005; Hunter and Nixon 2008). Home Ofﬁce research has also found that 60 per cent 
of ASBO recipients had known mental health, learning difﬁculties and substance 
addictions (Campbell 2002). As such, the application of contractual injunctions 
suggests more about the difﬁculty in understanding the needs of these ‘urban outcasts’ 
(Wacquant 2007) by choosing to bypass their often complex social problems through 
mentalities of rational-choice behaviour.  
Within the ﬁeld sites on which this article is based, drug and alcohol clinics, mental 
health services and supportive accommodation were either unavailable or massively 
over-subscribed, with waiting lists as long as 18 months. Although hostels and drop-in 
centres were available, these often had strict conditions for clients to not use drugs or 
alcohol on entrance, as well as only serving as short-term solutions to accommodation. 
The tenuous use of contractual injunctions as a method of dealing with the ‘outcasts’ 
of the urban populace were undoubtedly spurned by the difﬁculties in adequately 
supporting many persons with genuine social and psychological needs. In some cases, 
police ofﬁcers would openly admit to charging an individual in order to get them into 
drug support services or mental health support through referral to probation and youth 
justice services (see also Evans and Puech 2001; Phoenix 2006).  
It is argued during this article that there are two essential ways in which contractual 
injunctions are implemented, differing in relation to two main groups—young people 
and marginalized adult groups with drug/alcohol and mental health issues. For the 
latter groups, the liberal rationales of contractual injunctions tended to be more 
strongly emphasized in justifying their use amongst decision makers, notably police 
ofﬁcers. This focuses on the capacities for moderating behaviour, acknowledging the 
complexity of behavioural predicaments and slim chances of overall reform. For 
young people, the police and other agencies adopt responses akin to paternalistic 
practices, modifying behaviour through the belief that the persons can change. This 
embodies an ideological commitment to conventional tutelary ideologies associated 
with correcting perceived cultural deﬁciencies caused by parenting and disorderly 
community environments.  
 
Data  
 
The data forming the arguments of this article were collected during ethnographic 
ﬁeldwork that took place between April 2006 and September 2008. The ﬁeldwork 
consisted of observing decision-making interactions (case-conference panels) between 
different agency professionals based in two outer-London locations. These multi-
agency forums generally consisted of operational professionals with ‘hands-on’ rather 
than administrative relationships with their clients. Two hundred and four total case 
studies were observed during the decision-making panels, mainly consisting of 
individuals involved in low-level offending and anti-social behaviour. The cases were 
tracked and analysed over several months, thus allowing updates and new information 
to be included. Further observations were also carried out with individual agencies, 
including the shadowing of professionals such as police ofﬁcers and social workers. 
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The police were involved in every case involving the use of contractual injunctions, as well as the 
agency referring the most individuals to the case conference meetings (77 per cent in Hobart and 59 per 
cent in Shore Acres).  
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An additional 25 interviews were also carried out with a broad cross-section of 
professionals from across agencies, ten of which included police ofﬁcers.  
Over the course of the ﬁeldwork, the author was engaged in overt observation of a 
range of settings. Following Van Maanen’s (1978) typology of researcher roles, this 
consisted mainly of the position of ‘fan’ involving passively listening and recording 
information. Initially, this started with permission from the managers of the police 
anti-social behaviour units to attend case-conference meetings under the condition 
that places and client details were made anonymous. The ﬁeldwork was carried out on 
a full-time basis, which usually meant informal discussions with professionals weekly 
or fortnightly. It should be mentioned that in both locations, the author was involved 
in carrying out other research projects carried out for the police and other agencies 
that were initially separate to the ﬁeldwork informing this article. The contact with a 
range of professionals undoubtedly inﬂuenced the acceptance of my research, 
substantially increased trust relations and supported access to a range of materials that 
would perhaps have been otherwise obstructed.  
The original decision to select two areas (Shore Acres and Hobart) was to increase the 
generalizability of the ﬁndings by selecting two contrasting areas in order to assess 
the similarities and differences in the use of contractual injunctions. Both areas were 
of similar demographic proﬁles—primarily white, British, but with several deprived 
neighbourhoods. The areas differed in terms of service provision and infrastructure, 
with Hobart having a well established number of policing and social work teams 
operating in terms of outreach provision, compared to Shore Acres, which was 
developing these services during the period of the ﬁeldwork. These initiatives mainly 
directed attention towards young people ‘at risk’ of criminality or adults perceived as 
‘vulnerable’ by way of drug, alcohol and mental health problems. Although the 
programmes had no precise structures or guiding principles, their origins can be 
traced to the inﬂuences of ‘community policing’ and the development of ‘multi-
agency’ working from the mid 1990s (Crawford 1997; Gilling 1997; Hughes and 
Edwards 2002). In both locales, this appeared to reﬂect similar working responses to 
other areas in England and Wales, which, at the time of writing, were undergoing 
reform of working practices under the framework of Neighbourhood Policing (Home 
Ofﬁce 2004; 2010). This included closer links between agencies and local policing 
teams regarding the use of contractual injunctions, as well as forming wider links with 
the community in terms of responding to local concerns.  
Multi-agency case conference meetings included a range of professionals from 
agencies such as the police, housing landlords, mental health services, social services, 
youth agencies and substance-misuse teams who would meet monthly to exchange 
information about the referred individuals and attempt to devise interventions that 
could forestall or divert them from the criminal justice system. Although no formal 
legal powers were invested in the multi-agency panels, decisions could be used to 
secure enforcement action in the form of juridical or welfare-based sanctions through 
the mandate of an individual agency, meaning that a single agency would take action 
on behalf of the case-conference panel. As forthcoming data will illustrate, the police 
were by far the common purveyor of taking formal action compared to any other 
agency,
4
 complementing similar ﬁndings from elsewhere that have argued that multi-
agency forums tend to be dominated by the police (Foster 2002; Skinns 2008).  
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Tables providing quantitative data as a supplement to the qualitative details can be 
found in the Appendix section of this article.  
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Paternal Instincts and Occupational Cultures
5
  
  
The process of persuading the individual to engage in self-control of their behaviour 
is often one that involves a clear paternalistic edge. Although it has been argued that 
contractual injunctions are largely symbolic rather than about tangible forms of 
inducing behavioural change (Crawford 2009), I argue that the police use contractual 
injunctions in different ways towards ‘changeable’ groups such as young people 
compared to ‘non-engaging’ or ‘irredeemable’ groups such as the homeless, drug 
addicts, alcoholics and the mentally ill. Whereas young people are more commonly 
‘acted over’ paternalistically in order to ‘change’ their behaviour for the good, the 
problems of homeless and related groups are often simpliﬁed and glossed over to 
over-emphasize the rational-choice logics of contractual injunctions in order to secure 
a transparent justiﬁcation to punish.  
Police occupational culture and the logics of contractual injunctions can sometimes 
seem as at odds with one another. Whereas contractual injunctions place the onus on 
the recipient to change through norms of self-governance, the police more commonly 
operate within a culture of ‘changing’ persons through dictation of the rules of 
engagement, including their legitimate use of force. Police work during recent years 
has been affected by a range of factors, including managerialist changes (McLaughlin 
2005), the proliferation of multi-agency partnerships (Hughes et al. 2001; Hughes and 
Edwards 2002) and the growth of investigative technologies associated with ‘risk 
management’ (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). There have undeniably been major 
changes to the organization of the police both at management and street levels, as well 
as posing resistances and reformulations of the traditional cultures of policing (see 
Loftus 2008; 2010). Speciﬁc to the topics on which this article is based, the impact of 
state initiatives associated with the Respect Agenda (Respect Task Force 2006), as 
well as implemented guidelines from the Association of Chief Police Ofﬁcers (ACPO 
2008), has created a shift towards the police adopting a set of youth engagement-style 
policies such as setting up mentoring schemes and diversionary programmes. Whilst 
there were certainly positives to these types of roles, the implementation during the 
ﬁeld sites was clouded by criminalization and tutelary social controls against many 
young people.  
There often exists a ﬁne line between informal advice provided by a police ofﬁcer and 
the tacit consensus achieved through such relationships well before the law and other 
repressive instruments are brought into play. Ignorance of such advice not only taints 
the informal nature of the relationship between client and ofﬁcer, but challenges a 
wider component of police occupational culture, namely their service moralities. As 
Herbert (1997: 142–3) writes, ‘morality helps ofﬁcers derive an internal sense of 
justiﬁcation and coherence, how it helps them understand and value the various 
actions they undertake’ (author’s emphasis). Indeed, as Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno (2003: 94) add, enforcers of law ‘are producers of values and character that 
embody mainstream notions of moral worth and productive membership in society’. 
Whereas some police ofﬁcers manage their relationships more effectively in terms of 
making their intentions overt to the young person and maintaining professional 
distance in ‘befriending’-type situations, there exist a number of tensions with these 
exercises of informal support.   
Police ofﬁcers (mainly male ofﬁcers) often view young people as requiring informal 
forms of discipline and direction in cases in which there is no immediate father ﬁgure 
in the household. Other ofﬁcers would take it upon themselves to chaperone young 
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people around, providing them lifts to venues, taking them to the local youth club and 
conducting home visits to speak to the parent/s about the young person’s behaviour. 
These practices are both facilitated and encouraged by the occupational mandate of 
the police as seldom concerned with the individual changing their ways per se, but 
rather with the ways individuals listen and respond to the advice given to them by 
ofﬁcers. As a host of studies have illustrated (Fielding 1994; Herbert 1997; Reiner 
2000), the police cultivate strong moral beliefs about both the desirability of 
individuals embodied with upholding principles of ‘justice’ and moral righteousness. 
This corresponds closely to a sense of mission as a by-product of police work 
whereby the vocational features of policing as ‘more than a job’ also activate 
dedication towards ‘working on’ young people as a form of ‘project’. There may be 
psychotherapeutic beneﬁts for ofﬁcers to do this—both enhancing what they see as 
their mission to ‘change people’, as well as perhaps also fulﬁlling what they perceived 
as an important credential in their own upbringing. These types of narrative were 
expressed in half of all interviews carried out with male ofﬁcers, often articulated 
through personal anecdotes:  
 
My parents always taught me the importance of respect. I see part of my job as 
enforcing this in the kids I deal with as many of them just don’t seem to have any 
these days. (Interview with Dave, Police Ofﬁcer)  
 
This aspect of mission involves ofﬁcers transferring their skills about changing whom 
they consider to be ‘redeemable’ or ‘save-able’ persons—strategies that can often 
transgress their own service roles to help support individuals ‘beyond the call of duty’ 
(Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, especially p. 92). Going ‘beyond the call of 
duty’ to help a particular young person may render positive results for both parties if 
the relationship and intervention turn out to be productive and consensual ones. At the 
same time, such relationships that exist ‘beyond the call of duty’ have the potentials to 
infringe the police ofﬁcers’ own working credo regarding the clients’ take-up of the 
advice and adoption of the terms of the relationship. The ramiﬁcations of such an 
event are described in the case below in which the police acted in the ‘best interests’ 
of a client by placing an ASBO on them in order to regulate their associations with 
known assailants, as well as place prohibitions on entering certain geographic spaces. 
Although these types of responses were generally uncommon with the use of ASBOs 
(16 per cent of total cases), there were speciﬁc issues of tutelary control evident in 
response to young people:  
 
Tracy—an 18 year old girl living in Shore Acres—had been given an ASBO 
following regular disturbances in the town centre in which she and a group of men 
would regularly shout abuse at passers-by and drink in and around the bus depot. 
Tracy had been a regular at the local courts for petty offences such as shoplifting and 
drunken behaviour, but had persisted with such behaviours for several months 
following her reprimands by the court (usually a referral with the youth justice service 
or a community penalty). Arguably the trigger to Tracy’s ASBO was this very fact 
that the police had so far been unable to adequately deal with her behaviour, which 
from the police’s point of view of now required some kind of formal power to 
challenge her behaviour and ‘make her change’. Kate, the police ofﬁcer making the 
initial ASBO referral, presented Tracy as ‘spiralling out of control very quickly’ 
suggesting the need to intervene quickly because of her involvement with several 
‘undesirable’ males in the town centre whom Tracy would frequently drink alcohol 
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with. Kate concluded to the case-conference group that ‘the ASBO would be in her 
own best interests, in order to keep her away from the group of men whom she was 
hanging around drinking with’. There seemed to be complete agreement from most of 
the other agency representatives around the table, including both drug support 
workers and social workers. (Field notes—case-conference discussion)  
  
In the above case, none of the other men received any formal intervention, suggesting 
that the decision reﬂected some degree of chivalry and paternalism by the police. A 
week after the above case involving Tracy, she breached the order that rather than 
leading to the police pursuing an instant court date led to them adopting a defensive 
stance in protecting their own decision to pursue an ASBO as an alleged deterrent for 
Tracy to discontinue her anti-social behaviour:  
 
Kate, the police case-builder gave her verdict on Tracy’s breach as ‘just testing the 
water on her ASBO’, adding that they would continue to monitor her but not 
necessarily haul her into court again on the next breach. She added, ‘It [ASBO] is to 
protect people who use the town and protect Tracy who is out drinking with many 
undesirables’, admitting that she was concerned about the welfare of Tracy, 
particularly her contacts with several of the core town alcoholics. Several weeks after, 
Tracy’s behaviour was reported to be declining, however not due to the ASBO, but 
rather recent news of being pregnant and the fact that she had secured some housing. 
(Field notes—case-conference discussion)  
 
Justiﬁcations for ‘taking action’ as shown in the above account can often be driven by 
the amount of time and effort invested in trying to divert the individual away from the 
criminal justice system, creating a sense of vindictiveness amongst police ofﬁcers 
who can view the non-engagement of the individual as ‘throwing back in their faces’ 
all the hard work invested in them. Client ‘failures’ create challenges for agencies 
such as the police to make sense of and to justify responses in terms of their service 
functions. A frequent adaptive response involved re-conﬁguring the terms of contracts 
beyond the unwritten help and services invested via agencies of social control, 
towards a simple invocation of the basic terms of the contract as a mechanism for 
self-control that the recipient must obey or face possible criminal charges. Amongst 
groups with known substance misuse problems, without stable accommodation, and 
sometimes with mental health problems, the aims of using contractual injunctions 
were far more pessimistic. Instead of the paternalistic zeal that was often enacted 
upon young people believed to be ‘changeable’ or more easily diverted from 
criminality, the above groups were recognized as difﬁcult, if not impossible, to 
change, with their street behaviour such as drinking and rough sleeping instead 
conceived as ‘problems’ to be moderated rather than modiﬁed.  
 
From Behavioural Modiﬁcation to Behavioural Moderation  
 
Although paternalistic practices structure many of the uses of contractual injunctions 
amongst young people, different guiding values were evident with vulnerable adult 
groups, namely those with ‘complex’ lifestyles such as homeless populations, drug 
addicts and street drinkers. Rather than change such persons, who are often viewed as 
difﬁcult to change or moreover ‘irredeemable’ in certain cases, contractual injunctions 
are used to moderate behaviour in ways that remove the individuals and their actions 
to spaces outside the view of the everyday public. The idea of moderating behaviour, 
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rather than necessarily ceasing or changing, challenges the police to redeﬁne notions 
of success pertaining to their everyday functions as purveyors of the social order. In 
the wake of wider shifts in penality from rehabilitation to managing and containing 
risk (Feeley and Simon 1992; Lynch 1998), police emphasis on moderating rather 
than removing deviant persons reﬂects a similar acknowledgement of its limitations 
and realistic social control capacities. Contractual injunctions are theoretically 
designed to prevent persons engaging in deviant behaviour by placing conditions on 
their behaviour designed to be enforced by the recipient as much as the police. 
Although prevention has a long history as a key principle of police work, which can 
exist in conﬂict with ideological commitments to ‘crime ﬁghting’, these two 
dimensions are complementary rather than contradictory features of police work, 
especially when understood through the application of contractual injunctions. During 
every interview carried out with police ofﬁcers, the goals of prevention were 
intrinsically linked to police powers to banish and remove troublesome individuals 
related to ‘crime-ﬁghting’ ideologies:  
 
I will read the paper a lot and I will see that people will often say what is the point of 
ASBOs? Because there is a 60–70% failure rate and it is a tool which has been given 
by the government to use and it does not work. Rip it up, give it something else. 
Works brilliantly. When you look at getting an ASBO, that person has committed an 
awful lot of anti-social behaviour and criminal offences to earn that so to speak. They 
will probably come to our attention on a four to ﬁve time per week basis. Then 
eventually they get themselves an ASBO. With the teeth that the legislation has, that 
person knows if they breach that ASBO then they are probably looking at quite a 
severe punishment, often custodial. It prevents. So when you do get slips it maybe one 
in three months, one is six months, but I would sooner say to my public well we have 
got that and its reducing. (Interview with Neil, police ofﬁcer)  
 
Whereas banishment and removal are often by-products of these forms of 
criminalization, the role of the police can often be structured by its resource limits as 
much as its potential powers of exclusion and banishment. This is often packaged 
through a sense of benevolence such as ‘giving the recipient the opportunity to 
change’ rather than resorting to the criminal law as a tool of ﬁrst resort. However, 
during interviews and observation of police meetings regarding the policing of 
persons on contractual injunctions, the role of the police was considered to be one of 
moderation—structuring the individual’s use of space and lifestyle in ways that were 
seen as facilitating their own recognition of their deviant behaviour:  
 
That’s where you get your prohibitions from. Not ‘they’re drunk, let’s stop um 
drinking’. Actually that’s probably not going to help, but if you stop them drinking in 
areas where it is perceived as a problem and they go and drink somewhere else where 
they are not a problem then why stop them drinking in the whole of Hobart? And it 
helps them, it gives them a bit of control. But it is not unattainable for them to live 
with that prohibition ...non associations are great cos with a lot of these people they 
can’t see that actually their relationship with this other person is actually detrimental 
and why they are getting into trouble, or they are not strong enough to break away 
from it. It probably isn’t fair, but when the evidence is there then it is very easy to ask 
the court what you want. They [recipients] are all told that. (Interview with Kate, 
police sergeant)  
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The police as moderators of behaviour features as a common response towards 
‘problematic’ groups such as street homeless, substance addicts and those with mental 
health problems. The ideological sense this creates for police ofﬁcers is often driven 
by structural limitations regarding the availability of a range of social services to deal 
with the problems pertaining to the social groups described above. Such limits consist 
not merely of police resources per se, but also the lack of secure, long-term social 
services that may have previously housed and supported many individuals receiving 
contractual injunctions such as ASBOs. Although this was an issue that was more 
commonly raised amongst social workers and voluntary staff running hostel facilities, 
it was also a view expressed by 10 per cent of the sample of police ofﬁcers 
interviewed and discussed in 62 per cent of cases, consisting mainly of professionals 
who worked in the same community for a long period of time:  
 
Lyn (police ofﬁcer): From a police point of view sometimes the only way we can get 
someone to take notice if someone is an issue is to push them through the court 
process because that will then link in with a certain amount of support services.  
 
DM: So it pays to criminalise them in a way [laughs].  
 
Lyn: I know, I know. It’s terrible really. (Interview with Lyn, police ofﬁcer)  
 
The police, conscious of the realities of over-stretched or unavailable support services, 
often use contractual injunctions as a futile method that attempts to ‘empower’ 
individuals to become controllers of their own behaviour as a feature of their own 
reform as much as a potential form of sanction on breach. In many situations, those 
with complex lifestyles, such as the street homeless and drug users, unsurprisingly 
‘failed’ to moderate their behaviour. As such, contractual injunctions were simply 
invoked as more transparent legal mechanisms for proving lack of compliance, 
enabling methods of banishment to conveniently bypass the complexities of socially 
marginal groups by removing them from the area or imprisoning them for breach of 
their injunction (Beckett and Herbert 2010).  
 
Self-Governance as a Blaming Device  
 
Modifying or moderating behaviour through the use of contractual injunctions can 
also have a wider effect in blaming the recipient in ways that employ simplistic 
rational-choice assessments of behaviour. Contractual injunctions are theoretically 
designed to be preventive in providing the recipient with the opportunities to change. 
The transparency of the process behind the use of contractual injunctions allows 
breach to be conceived as simply the recipient ‘choosing’ not to comply. As Maynard-
Moody and Musheno (2003) have argued, in responding to clients deemed ‘unworthy’, 
street-level bureaucrats become rigid rule followers in seeking to make their 
judgments to punish a client watertight and transparent in order to avoid the 
possibilities for resistance and challenge from other agencies (Emerson 1969; Feeley 
1979; Lipsky 1980; Hawkins 1992, amongst others).  
Where the limits of the agencies’ capacities to control behaviour are under question 
and the behaviour of the individual is seen as worsening, ideologies of self-
governance become stronger and are more commonly utilized as strategies that 
displace blame from agencies and place responsibility on the recipient. Changing 
persons through the values of paternalism starts to give way to persons changing 
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meaning that ideas of self-governance become primary shapers in the articulation of 
blame and culpability. In 22 per cent of cases, the needs of individuals were 
strategically sidelined and often set up to fail:  
 
You try everything you can, but at the end of the line is the enforcement route. I think 
there have been a few over the years, not many, but a few where you work your way 
through the various bits of engagement work, then you get to a point where the only 
thing that is left is the enforcement and they get locked up. You can’t do anymore 
really. You have tried to offer them this, you have tried to offer them that, and they 
don’t want to play, so there is not a lot else apart from sending the boys round. Then 
they end up with a three month sentence, or a year sentence and you just think, ‘ah 
well’ .... (Interview with Vicky, police sergeant)  
  
We don’t have hundreds of ASBOs, we are back down to small numbers so we can 
regulate them properly. People don’t get away with breaching their ASBOs .... It’s an 
easy arrest as well .... My experience is that most of them breach because of who they 
are [background etc]. (Informal interview with Kate, police ant-social behaviour 
coordinator)  
 
At the same time as the bifurcated tensions between these two positions—changing 
persons or persons-changing—police ofﬁcers become conscious of ﬁnding external 
sources of legitimacy and justiﬁcation for their decisions to take enforcement action 
against persons construed as not changing their behaviour in accordance with their 
contractual injunction. During case-conference meetings and often documented in the 
local news media thereafter, the police commonly drew upon a set of narratives that 
invoked notions of ‘community impact’ and ‘public protection’ in taking enforcement 
action against individuals. This was often combined with a sense of inevitability 
regarding the person not changing, giving the police ‘no choice’ but to serve an 
ASBO:  
 
Liz (housing ofﬁcer): Tony is just completely chaotic. He was evicted last week and is 
not engaging with me. He has been sleeping rough in the town and been shouting 
abuse at people.  
 
Kate (police sergeant): Would the ASBO route work?  
 
Liz: He would just breach it to be honest.  
 
Kate: Maybe just a case that he goes inside then [prison].  
 
Trisha (police ofﬁcer): I’m not sure what we can do with him.  
 
Kate: We need to protect the public. I think the ASBO would be the best path.  
[Nods of agreement from professionals around the table] (Extract from case-
conference discussion)  
 
During multi-agency discussion panels as well as in a variety of other police meetings, 
the alleged victims, except in cases of distinct persons, were rarely mentioned. This 
approach actively tapped into state discourses emanating from the Anti-Social 
Behaviour unit of the Home Ofﬁce, which has continually advocated action being 
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taken to ‘protect the public’, validating and contributing to the existential belief in a 
passive, innocent, law-abiding public threatened by the behaviour of certain ‘lawless’ 
individuals (e.g. Home Ofﬁce 2003; Respect Task Force 2006; Cabinet Ofﬁce 2008). 
This is not to deny the legitimate need for action in certain scenarios, but to suggest 
that the police did, for the most part, construct and directly steer the discussions 
towards pre-set agendas. This complements research by Herbert (2005) that showed 
during his analysis of police–community relations that the police, far from adequately 
basing their own priorities from the needs and requests of the community, actively 
construct priorities based upon their continued professional judgment as to what 
constitutes ‘real’ police work. In so doing, the police both invoke the community as a 
source of legitimacy to their own public facing image, whilst carefully managing their 
own working credo to complement the existence of their directedness as an 
organization charged with a range of social control functions. The use of phrases such 
as ‘community harm’ or ‘public protection’, far from being values that the police 
genuinely strive towards in validating decisions, come to act as crucial symbolic 
components in adding justiﬁcation and quashing potential forms of dissent from other 
agency professionals. When applying ASBOs in particular, this process of acting over 
the community serves not only as an example of paternalism at work by appearing to 
operate in what appear to be their ‘best interests’, but also to facilitate and 
furthermore accelerate individualized forms of blame and castigation toward socially 
marginal populations.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The aims of this article have been two-fold. First, it has explained how ideas of self-
governance translate on the ground and connect with the occupational cultures of the 
police. This has included the practical value system of paternalism, which, it is argued, 
continues to preserve occupational identity of the police and structure responses 
through the use of contractual injunctions towards young people. The second part of 
the paper has detailed the precise ways in which the use of contractual orders shifts in 
response towards two main groups—young people who are more readily dealt with by 
police as people to be changed via behavioural modiﬁcation and adult socially 
marginal populations such as homeless populations, substance addicts and those with 
mental health issues whose difﬁculty in being changed by the police leads instead to 
policies of behaviour moderation being adopted. It has been argued that not only are 
contractual injunctions implemented in different ways by the police, but the goals of 
such injunctions are manipulated to connect with pre-existing judgments of the 
‘changeability’ of the recipient. This connects the use of contractual injunctions to 
judgments regarding the moral ‘worthiness’ of some individuals (largely young 
people) through to the complexities of managing those deemed ‘irredeemable’ (the 
homeless, drug addicts, street drinkers). This has two main features regarding the role 
of the police. (1) It establishes the police as actively striving to help many young 
persons through paternalistic value systems of behavioural modiﬁcation, sometimes 
using contractual injunctions as mechanisms to operate in the ‘best interests’ of the 
young person by keeping them away from certain persons or out of certain areas. (2) 
The police model used to deal with complex socially marginal adult groups regularly 
adopts pessimistic policies of behaviour moderation, believing that such groups are 
often ‘unchangeable’ or ‘irredeemable’. The latter, although the police do not 
necessarily target them as ‘proper’ criminals, are viewed as major challenges to the 
police to deal with due to the complexity of their life situations and limited 
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compliance to many social control responses. As such, the role of the police in 
moderating behaviour—removing them from public view, disrupting their routines 
and placing the onus on the recipient to enact self-governance—reﬂects much about 
their limits in managing such persons, with contractual injunctions serving as futile 
responses to instil compliance in socially marginal groups. Contractual injunctions 
such as ASBOs are both ineffective in securing compliance and problematic in 
threatening to simply criminalize persons with unaddressed social and psychological 
problems. Contractual orders for young people, despite often benign (in the case of 
ABCs) and manifest in benevolent police response (for ASBOs), serve to confuse the 
respective functions of the police and threaten to violate the rights of young people 
through their heavy emphasis on paternalism and tutelary control. Whether this 
apparent benevolence fused with paternal dogma can be considered a supportive 
means of intervention remains a belief clouded in historical suspicion and scepticism 
(Platt 1969; Donzelot 1979; Cohen 1985).  
 As a ﬁnal remark on the wider social effects that contractual injunctions have on the 
shifting landscape of social control, it has been argued that the proliferation of 
contractual injunctions as methods of dealing with ‘vulnerable’ populations has 
accorded with two key features. The ﬁrst is the ways in which contractual injunctions 
abstract the recipient from the deeper social and psychological circumstances of their 
behaviour, to simplify complexity of their situations through the assertion of self-
control and moderation. The increasing tendency to de-socialize behaviour from 
issues of political economy may be both realistic and desirable for the highly 
stretched police ofﬁcer to adopt. However, for the role of the state as ultimately the 
architects and designers of contractual injunctions, this reﬂects a suitable ignorance of 
complex social issues compounding many socially marginal persons, prioritizing the 
reiﬁed construction of the ‘public in need of protection’ as a glossing mechanism for 
the relative impotence of the police to truly understand and respond to ‘difﬁcult’ 
clients.  
The second aspect aligned with the previous point is the dwindling and resource-
stretched reality of many social services. Many police ofﬁcers admitted to the lack of 
social service provision as one of the main reasons behind the perceived need to enact 
some form of control on socially marginal persons. The lack of long-term social 
services in the ﬁeld sites, such as drug outreach clinics, mental health facilities and 
psychiatric care, mirrored the proliferation in contractual injunctions. Contractual 
injunctions serve to criminalize many social problems such as poverty, homelessness, 
mental health and substance misuse, applying contractual injunctions as a futile way 
of enforcing compliance. Complementing research on similar contractual injunctions 
in the United States (Beckett and Herbert 2008), as well as broader literature on the 
punishment of socially marginal populations (Wacquant 2009), this article has 
suggested that contractual injunctions should be viewed as tools suggesting more 
about the limitations of social control agencies to deal with the everyday effects of 
social marginality and inequality rather than as tangible crime control mechanisms 
that reﬂect desired and reasoned attempts to modify or moderate behaviour.  
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Appendix  
 
TABLE 1 Background data on combined distribution of cases from case conferences 
(n = 204) 
 
Typology Main age Gender 
distribution 
Typical 
intervention/outcome 
Average 
months 
on case 
conference 
Disadvantaged 
young people 
10–18 Female 22% 
 
 
Male 78% 
Referrals to support 
agencies 
(60% of cases) 
ABC
1
 (40% of 
cases) ASBOs
2
 
(4% of cases) 
4 
 
Marginalized 
adults—
alcoholism, 
drug use 
18–30 Female 15% 
Male 85% 
 
Referrals to hostels 
and mental 
health services 
(approx. 20% of 
cases), up to 
ASBO/prison (5% 
of cases) 
3–4 
 
 
1
Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABCs). 
2
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs). 
 
 
TABLE 2 Interviewee responses  
 
Narrative response Typicality of response (% 
of all cases, n = 204) 
Type of case subjects to 
whom response applied 
Paternalistic/tutelage—
control 
in their ‘best interests’ 
16% Young people 86% 
Adults 14% 
Individualized 
blame/responsibility 
(ignored/not followed 
advice from agencies, 
individual as cause of 
problems) 
22% Adults 74% 
Young people 26% 
Blame parent/s for young 
person’s behaviour 
(e.g. poor parenting skills, 
lack of supervision, 
neglect, abuse) 
41% Young people 100% 
Partial culpability—
reference to social or 
psychological 
circumstances (e.g. drugs, 
mental health issues, 
62% Young people 76% 
Adults 24% 
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financial hardship, 
unemployment) 
Last resorts punishment 
(individual given 
opportunities to change but 
not taken them) 
4% Adults 95% 
Young people 5% 
Banishment (i.e. attempt to 
remove from area) 
6% Adults 94% 
Young people 6% 
Control as ‘protecting the 
public’ 
7% Adults 97% 
Young people 3% 
 
*Note that types of response often include more than one category.  
  
 
